Christopher L. Bennett
CHINESE HISTORY – SELECTED ESSAYS
Part III
Mao Zedong wrote, AThe history of modern China is a history of imperialist aggression, of imperialist opposition to China=s independence and to her development of capitalism.@ Was this assessment accurate?
There are certainly solid grounds for the argument that China suffered from imperialist aggression. Japan=s desire to compete upon the world stage turned it into an expansionistic imperial power in the early 20th century, and China bore the brunt of this. The Japanese absorption of the Ryukyu Islands in 1873 was just the beginning; soon thereafter Japan began competing with China over the control of Korea, leading to the 1894-5 war which China lost. The treaty forced China to give Japan territory, money and influence in the country, a humiliating experience for the Chinese. A decade later Japan later intruded on Manchuria in its war with Russia, and in World War I Japan occupied German holdings in China and made even more humiliating demands, which would have basically put Japan in charge of China. Massive popular resistance in China led Japan to back down on its harshest demands, but this was hardly the end of it. Matters escalated into Japan=s 1931 conquest of Manchuria, the Rape of Nanjing, and the Eastern half of World War II. Japan certainly gave the Chinese good reason to feel victimized by imperialist aggression.
Of course, the West played a role in this as well, at least since Britain launched the Opium War against China in 1840. The Western nations tended to seek economic power and political influence in China rather than overt conquest or settlement; but they were never shy about using gunboats to ensure their financial and diplomatic interests. They also took advantage of military victories over the Middle Kingdom to exact humiliating concessions from it, gaining more and more control every time the Chinese tried to shake them off. It is perhaps an exaggeration to call this overt Aaggression,@ aside from the Opium Wars. The Western powers= use of force in 1900, for instance, was a response to the uprising of the Yi-he-quan, technically defensive rather than aggressive. But the ABoxers=@ violence was a reaction to cultural and economic imperialism. And as usual, the West exacted still further indemnities and concessions from an increasingly impoverished China.
AOpposition to China=s independence@ is also a somewhat reasonable interpretation, given how many of the treaties imposed on China by Japan and Western powers further and further eroded China=s sovereignty, making China more economically dependent and increasing outside political influence. Japan=s 21 Demands of 1915 would have placed Japanese Aadvisors@ in oversight of the Chinese military, police and government.
Given that Mao was a communist, it is confusing that he would complain about Aimperialist opposition... to [China=s] development of capitalism.@ It also does not seem consistent with the facts. The primary interest of the Western powers in China was economic; they saw China as a vast market for capital investment, and their diplomatic and military initiatives largely served the goal of opening that market to their exploitation. This was the main drive behind the British actions which led to the Opium War, and was reflected in the subsequent treaty, which forced China to open multiple ports and abolish its tariffs and the Cohong system which was seen as restricting trade. The Western powers seemed quite eager to promote the development of laissez-faire capitalism in China.
Mao=s analysis falls short in another, more substantial way. According to him, Athe history of modern China@ is defined purely by the impositions of outsiders. Typically of anti-imperialist rhetoric, Mao defines China as a unified, monolithic society whose only sources of stress are externally imposed. But multiple internal factors played key roles in shaping the history of early-20th century China. The Qing Dynasty=s weakness in response to imperialists heightened Han resentment against their Manchu rulers, dividing the nation. The nature and history of the imperial system had led to successively more isolated and feeble emperors, ultimately resulting in a situation where the intrigues between an ineffectual emperor (Guang-xu) and an all-powerful regent (the dowager Cixi) overwhelmed efforts at reform. The lessened influence of the state led to the rise of powerful local officials and warlords from the elite class, which had always had more influence over local affairs than the court had in any case. This divided the country, weakening it and exacerbating its crises. Chinese reformers blamed China=s problems as much on Confucian conventions as on Western aggression; in fact, they generally advocated adopting Asuccessful@ Western ways as replacements for Afailed@ Confucianism. The disagreement within the Chinese people over whether Confucian tradition should be preserved or replaced produced more arguments than solutions.
Thus, it is simplistic to assert that this period of China=s history was shaped solely by imperialist actions. China=s own history is far too deep and complex to be so cavalierly dismissed. Much of what transpired in this period was a continuation of trends stretching back centuries or millennia. Chinese history and culture intermingled with outside influences to shape the events of the period. Mao did his own civilization a grave injustice by painting it as a passive victim.
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Ranbir Vohra writes: AIn the final analysis the Nationalist government [of Jiang Jeishi (Chiang Kai-shek)] was not overthrown by a >spontaneous proletariat uprising= (as orthodox Marxists would have wanted it) or even by a >popular revolution= (as Lenin had achieved in Russia) but defeated by an organized military government using military tactics and strategy.@ (Vohra, China=s Path to Modernization, 181) Is this a fair assessment of the 1949 victory of the Chinese Communist Party?
First, it is necessary to evaluate Vohra=s characterizations of Marxism and the Russian Revolution. It is difficult to pin down a basis for the claim that Marxism preached a Aspontaneous proletariat uprising.@ Marx did teach a somewhat deterministic view of historical evolution in which the replacement of capitalism with communism was seen as inevitable. However, this did not necessarily imply that it would Ajust happen@ automatically -- or that, as Vohra=s use of Aspontaneous@ implies, the proletariat masses would simply wake up one morning and decide to overthrow the state after breakfast. Marx himself presented two conflicting views of revolution. To quote the Encyclopedia Britannica,
One is that of a final conflagration,
>a violent suppression of the old
conditions of production,= which occurs when the opposition between bourgeoisie and
proletariat has been carried to its extreme
point..... The other conception is that of a permanent revolution
involving a provisional coalition between the proletariat and the petty
bourgeoisie rebelling against a capitalism that is only superficially united.
Once a majority has been won to the coalition, an unofficial proletarian
authority constitutes itself alongside the revolutionary bourgeois authority.
Its mission is the political and revolutionary education of the proletariat,
gradually assuring the transfer of legal power from the revolutionary
bourgeoisie to the revolutionary proletariat.[1]
Marx did not clearly specify whether the revolution would occur through military or political means. Nor did he apparently mandate that the revolution must arise spontaneously rather than being organized and mobilized by leaders. However, neither of Marx=s models seems consistent with an organized proletarian state mounting a military victory in a civil war. Thus, the overthrow of the Nationalists does not seem to follow Marx=s model.
It is an oversimplification to say that Lenin achieved a popular revolution in Russia. The revolution here did in fact begin spontaneously, in response to the hardships of World War I and the corruption of the Romanovs. Lenin had to be smuggled into the country months later in order to capitalize on it. He then launched an aggressive campaign to overthrow the Provisional Government and institute a Bolshevik state. The majority of Russia=s revolutionaries favored the Apermanent-revolution@ approach of a coalition with the bourgeoisie and a gradual transfer of power, but Lenin rejected this, hewing religiously to Marx=s earlier model of violent overthrow. He seized power in a coup, and legitimized himself by claiming allegiance with the actual spontaneous peasant revolution which was going on already, independently of the political and theoretical wanglings of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks etc. Lenin did not lead this revolution, he simply grabbed its coattails. However, once Lenin and the Bolsheviks had gained power, they had to fight a three-year civil war in order to consolidate it.
Was the situation in China thus fundamentally different from that in Russia? Ultimately Lenin=s victory was that of an Aorganized military government@ winning a civil war. One of the main differences is that in Russia the former state had collapsed on its own before this government was established, and the civil war was against a number of competing factions rather than one enemy regime. Mao, from roughly 1936 onward, had been systematically building a rural state within the state, organizing and leading the peasant revolutionaries. This is the other prime difference: Mao galvanized and directed the revolutionary energies of the masses rather than merely capitalizing on them. Unlike Lenin, he succeeded in gaining power because he won the support of the rank-and-file peasants, and because Jiang Jeishi so systematically alienated them.
Initially, the Chinese Communists also employed a strategy of cooperation with the petty bourgeoisie (middle peasants). Exclusive emphasis on serving the poor to the detriment of the middle peasants was condemned as leftist excess, as William Hinton depicted in Fanshen. Until the excesses of later decades, the Chinese Communist Party was dedicated to a steady, gradual transition of economic and political power from the bourgeiosie to the proletariat, as specified by Marx=s permanent-revolution model. In this sense, Mao was closer to Marx than Lenin was. Arguably he was closer to Marx=s armed-cataclysm model too, the one which Lenin promoted so fiercely, because Mao=s movement was more genuinely based on mass support than Lenin=s rather bald power grab.
So it is a valid conclusion that the application of Marxist revolutionary models in practice differed from the initial theory, and differed still further between one country and another. It is also true that this is a somewhat obvious point. Reality never follows theory precisely, and any political, economic or social model must be adjusted to the dynamics and history of a particular culture in which it is applied. The differing applications of Marxism in different countries and times merely illustrate its dynamism as a political theory.
* * * * *
The student uprising in Beijing in June 1989 has been interpreted in the West as a democracy movement. Is this interpretation accurate? If not, how did the perception arise?
There were certainly Chinese activists campaigning for democratic reforms in the late 1980s, most notably the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi. Fang advocated outright Westernization, overtly rejecting Chinese culture and calling socialism a failure. In Ranbir Vohra=s words, he Asoon became the idol of the university students@ (Vohra, 271). Clearly the explicit idea of democracy was present in the political rhetoric of the time and was used as a mobilizing force.
However, Vohra goes on to say: AIt appears the cause of the unrest lay more in the poor educational system and the cris[e]s created by urban reforms (such as inflation and corruption) than in any deep-seated desire for democracy, a concept not fully understood by the students@ (ibid., 272). The students were frustrated at their poor living conditions and the lack of funding for educational institutions and teachers, a frustration exacerbated when they saw wealthy party members leading lives of luxury on the fruits of graft and corruption.
When the students began their demonstration on Tiananmen Square, their demands contained no actual mention of democracy. Specifically, they demanded that the leaders Aend corruption in the party, publish details of personal assets of high officials and their family members, put price controls on consumer goods, lift restrictions on the press, and increase funds for higher education.@ This was not incompatible with a socialist state; indeed, Zhao Ziyang expressed the view that the students were Aby no means opposed to our fundamental system. Rather they are asking us to correct mistakes in our work@ (ibid., 275).
It was natural for Western observers to read democracy into this movement. The campaign called for such things as greater individual freedoms and greater government accountability to the people. In Western political thought, these principles are intrinsically linked with democratic models; therefore a connection is taken for granted. As Zhao=s comment demonstrates, those from different cultural-political backgrounds would not necessarily jump to the same conclusions.
However, the students themselves began adding outright references to democracy when the foreign press got involved. Eager to attract attention and global support, the protestors extemporized signs invoking democratic principles and slogans associated with the American history of the struggle for freedom (such as AGive Me Liberty or Give Me Death@ and AI Have a Dream,@ as mentioned in ibid., 276), not to mention the blatantly imitative AGoddess of Democracy@ statue.
Does this mean there was no real democracy movement? Fang wanted democracy, but his students evidently did not truly understand his agenda and had their own economically-motivated reasons for protest. But is this really so unusual? It is arguable that the majority of the followers of any movement do not really embrace or understand its detailed principles as defined by its leaders, but instead are drawn to it because they see it as serving their own agendas, or granting them greater opportunities than they currently have. Just because the followers do not define Ademocracy@ as the leaders and theorists define it does not mean they do not consider themselves a democracy movement. They merely provide their own definitions for the term, in much the same way that Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh and others have invented their own numerous definitions of Marxism.