Christopher L. Bennett
CHINESE HISTORY – SELECTED ESSAYS
Part II
Western historians often make the assertion that Chinese civilization Astagnated@ between the Song and Qing Dynasties, and address the question of why this occurred. In so doing, they generally fail to examine the validity of their own question. Historians must take care not to construct questions containing assumptions which prejudice the answers. AStagnation@ is a loaded term, conveying a distinctly negative image, one with implications of lifelessness and decay. It is best to reject this term from the outset, and recast the question: Did Chinese civilization become less dynamic between the Song and Qing Dynasties? ADynamic@ has its own emotionally loaded connotations, but it can be useful if we define it in a strict sense, in terms of the level of innovation and change in a society, and if we treat it purely quantitatively rather than qualitatively, making no assumptions about whether more dynamism is Abetter@ than less.
We must also recognize that dynamism cannot be measured on a single scale. Do we speak of technological dynamism? Economic dynamism? Political? Artistic? Religious? Not all of these areas must be equally dynamic at the same time. Is it fair to judge a culture=s level of dynamism based on considering only one or two of these areas? In exploring the question of Chinese dynamism over the specified period, we must address all these aspects.
Western claims of Astagnation@ generally apply to the technological and economic spheres, and are invoked to explain China=s Afailure@ to industrialize as Europe did. How dynamic was China in these areas from Song to Qing times? Certainly major technological growth was achieved in the early centuries of this period, in areas such as printing, shipbuilding and firearms. Agricultural and manufacturing technologies also advanced, enabling greater productivity. New, fast-ripening strains of rice were bred, allowing multiple harvests.
Though the growth of major cities had slowed by Ming and Qing times, smaller market towns proliferated, and the role of merchants in the economy steadily increased. New economic relations developed as merchants became more involved in the production of goods, and a system of outsourcing to independent cottage producers organized production on a larger scale.
Though these factors did not lead to European-style industrialization, that does not mean China proved somehow deficient. Industrial development did not accelerate as it did in the West, and may even have slowed somewhat in response to population pressure or other factors, but cannot be said to be static.
Chinese society did progress in other areas. Printing brought about a proliferation of literacy and education. Governmental reforms brought about greater egalitarianism over the centuries. New literary forms, the drama and the novel, emerged in Ming times. Artists based their work on earlier, traditional forms, but brought fresh reinterpretations and variations to these classic themes.
Developments in Neo-Confucianism occurred mainly during the Song, but Qing China had the potential for a new religious dynamism, at least in a small percentage of the populace. In considering this point, we must recognize that a key ingredient of cultural dynamism is the incorporation of outside influence. This does not mean abandoning one=s own ways to embrace an outside view unchanged, but rather taking outside elements, reinterpreting them and fitting them into one=s own culture in a way that brings fresh life both to the culture and the outside idea. In this instance, the outside influence was the Catholicism of the Jesuits, in which the Qing emperors took great interest. The Jesuits= policy of cultural accommodation enabled a process of syncretization, wherein Catholicism began to be reinterpreted in ways compatible with traditional Chinese practices and outlooks. Potentially, a fresh, new, uniquely Chinese variant of Christianity could have evolved from this, adding a novel element to the ongoing mix of faiths in China. But the Catholic orthodoxy rebelled at the syncretic process, clamping down on it in a heavy-handed way which insulted the Qing and soured them on further exploration of Christianity. In this case, it was the European institution that was lacking in dynamism and held back change.
In one key respect, though, Chinese civilization did lose dynamism in the Ming and Qing eras. The civil service examination system, though a very effective and rational means of assembling a qualified administrative class, became increasingly calcified and restrictive. The testing process became more formulaic, based increasingly on rigid adherence to form, with less and less regard for substance or imagination. Officials were appointed based on their memorization skills and calligraphy rather than anything directly relevant to governmental duties. The officialdom became more concerned with preserving the proper forms of behavior than with managing the practical needs of the state. It is difficult to see any spark of dynamism here, or to deny that it had a deleterious impact on the overall dynamism of Qing China.
But it is not fair to call this Astagnation.@ Clearly China had not simply stopped developing. But any society=s development goes through phases characterized by different levels of dynamism. Often a period of conservatism and retrenchment will come as a reaction to a period of rapid innovation; or the buildup of unresolved problems during a conservative period will eventually spark a movement for radical change. Certainly the Taiping Rebellion was such a movement, and certainly radical changes came to China in its wake. We cannot assume these changes would not have happened in the absence of Western influence. Arguably a new period of dynamism was beginning in the 19th century, a period of instability of which Europe was able to take advantage. But in Europe=s absence, China would have entered a new period of innovation as it sought its own equilibrium, and might well have had the incentive to develop industrialization and beyond.
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Western observers, upon contemplating the fact that Ming and Qing China were as technologically advanced and economically active as Europe in its age of global expansion, often wonder why China did not undergo a comparable era of global conquest and colonization. They fail to recognize the flawed assumptions underlying the question, which presumes that Europe=s experience was somehow an automatic or default outcome. This overlooks the ways in which Europe=s expansion was driven by its own history and circumstances, ones which differed from those of China.
Much of the motivation underlying European conquest arises from that continent=s distinct history. For instance, by 1500 the Spaniards and Portuguese had spent centuries fighting to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula from its Islamic rulers and reconvert its people to Catholicism. They had thus developed a tradition of territorial expansion which had acquired the aspect of a holy cause. Their history had led them to believe it was morally right and necessary to spread Christendom to new lands through force of arms.
The aggressive expansionistic and colonial efforts of other European states may have arisen from Europeans= long history of political rivalry. England and France presumably felt obligated to compete with Spain and Portugal and with each other, to prevent their rivals from gaining the advantage in territory, wealth and global influence.
But perhaps as great an incentive, if not a greater one, was economic in nature. Europe in this age had a strongly mercantile economy, and was thus constantly eager to seek new customers, markets and resources. Also, Europe was not the wealthiest or most sophisticated part of the world, and its people were eager to acquire the riches and advances available in the East. Given how strongly European expansion was driven by the lure of the treasures and luxuries in Asia=s possession, it seems somewhat disingenuous for Europeans to wonder why Asians were content to stay where they were.
Of course, this is too pat an explanation, so the specific situation in China must be explored further. One point worth noting is that Chinese history was hardly devoid of conquest and expansion. The vast territory today dubbed China Proper was unified by conquest numerous times. The civilization of the Han people began in a much smaller region and gradually spread out to encompass a vast percentage of the Earth=s land surface. Numerous distinct ethnic groups and cultures were assimilated (more or less) into this sprawling empire. Perhaps by Ming times it was already as large an empire as it could practically be. The surrounding lands to the north, west and south were undesirable for various reasons. This raises the question, though, of why a maritime empire was not established.
For one thing, Europe was not truly able to build a coherent maritime colonial empire (as opposed to trade domination) until the steam engine was developed. Industrialization did not occur in China, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this essay and have been explored elsewhere. More significantly, though, China did not find it necessary to conquer far-flung lands in order to gain what it wished from them. Instead, China got what it needed through its tribute system. This mechanism for intercultural relations had been established over millennia of uneasy interactions with the horse nomads of the Central Asian steppes. Their territory was unsuitable for conquest and assimilation by an agrarian society; thus China had to find other ways to manage the threat and achieve stability. The system of tribute that resulted allowed China to feel it had outsiders under control without the need to assert that control by force.
However, in order to maintain its air of superior strength, China was obliged to be the more generous partner in the trade interactions underlying the tribute system. This could not have been sustained if China=s economy had not been quite strong and self-sufficient, with no need to rely on imports or outside markets. Here is a more pragmatic restatement of the point made somewhat facetiously earlier: China was a source of wealth which drew others to it, and thus did not have the same drive as others to seek wealth elsewhere.
China=s economy was also based on different principles. As mentioned above, Europe was highly mercantile, driving the search for new customers, markets and goods. In Confucian China, however, merchants were disdained in favor of an agrarian economy. Thus one of the key incentives underlying European expansion was discouraged in Chinese culture.
Another cultural aspect making expansion undesirable to Chinese society was the charitable-estate system in which elite families obtained their entire income from the rents paid by tenant farmers on their estates. Opening up new territories would have produced a drain in the tenant-farmer population and thus in the elites= coffers.
In summary, there is no one predictable model for what a human society will do once it reaches a given technological level. Its actions will be shaped by its own distinct history, cultural dynamics and economic principles. Humans are not invariably a race of conquerors; conquest is a response to particular circumstances and needs. Perhaps if the West had not been so quick to read its own conqueror=s ideology into the nations of the East and armor itself against that perceived threat, global relations in the past century might have gone better.